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Disentangling The Thick Concept Argument
Olle Blomberg
Abstract
Critics argue that non-cognitivism cannot adequately account for the  
existence and nature of some thick moral concepts. They use the existence of 
thick concepts as a lever in an argument against non-cognitivism, here called 
the Thick Concept Argument (TCA). While TCA is frequently invoked, it is 
unfortunately rarely articulated. In this paper, TCA is first reconstructed on 
the basis of John McDowell’s formulation of the argument (from 1981), and 
then evaluated in the light of several possible non-cognitivist responses. In 
general, TCA assumes too much about what a non-cognitivist is (or must be) 
committed to. There are several non-cognitivist theories, and only some fit 
the view attacked by TCA. Furthermore, TCA rests on a contestable intuition 
about a thought experiment, here called the External Standpoint Experiment 
(ESE). It is concluded that TCA is remarkably weak, given how frequently 
the argument is invoked.
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Introduction
Philosophers tend to look for particular words as marks of morality at work: 
‘good’, ‘treacherous’, ‘promise’, ‘just’, ‘cruel’, ‘ought’, ‘honest’, and so on. 
The concepts corresponding to these words can be distinguished according to 
their degree of descriptive content. On the one hand, we have our most general 
thin moral concepts, think of ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’ and ‘ought’. On 
the other hand, we have the less domain-general thick moral concepts like 
‘treacherous’, ‘rude’, ‘cruel’, and ‘honest’. I will simply call these two classes 
of moral concepts “thin concepts” and “thick concepts”, leaving out “moral” 
from now on. 
Thick concepts appear to cause trouble for non-cognitivism because, in the 
words of Bernard Williams, they “seem to express a union of fact and value” 
(1985, p. 129). Such a union threatens an apparently central assumption of 
non-cognitivism, namely that a clear distinction can be drawn between evalu-
ative and non-evaluative language. For example, Alfred Ayer’s emotivism 
(2001[1936]) rests on a sharp distinction between a moral and a non-moral 
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vocabulary.1 Some later non-cognitivists, like Charles Stevenson and Richard 
Hare, have instead drawn the distinction at an underlying level of meaning 
components. On their view, the meaning of a thick concept can be unpacked 
in roughly the following  way: ‘This is X’, where X is a thick moral concept, 
means “This has the purely descriptive qualities or relations A, B, C, ..., and I 
(dis)approve of X because of A, B, C, ....”2 Hence, a purely descriptive meaning 
component can be disentangled from the meaning of the concept as a whole, 
leaving out the approval or disapproval. 
Well-known contemporary non-cognitivists like Allan Gibbard (1990, 
1992) and Simon Blackburn (1981, 1992, 1998) reject Hare’s two-component 
analysis. They do not arrive at non-cognitivism from a commitment to a par-
ticular view of lexical meaning but rather from a commitment to a Galilean 
naturalism.
However, critics argue that non-cognitivists, regardless of the particular 
type of analysis they employ, cannot adequately account for the existence and 
nature of some thick concepts. I call these critics Entanglers. They use the 
existence of thick concepts as a lever in an argument against non-cognitivism 
that I call the Thick Concept Argument or TCA. The argument originates in John 
McDowell’s writings from the late 70s and early 80s. Bernard Williams later 
connected McDowell’s line of thought with his own notion of thick concepts 
(1985, pp. 141-142). In recent years, TCA has  been invoked, for example, 
by Hilary Putnam in 2002 (ch. 2), by Alice Crary in 2002 (pp. 389-390), and 
by Charles Taylor in 2003 (p. 306). Unfortunately, while TCA is frequently 
invoked, the argument is rarely articulated. 
I do two things in this paper. First, in section 1, I articulate what I take to be 
the most charitable interpretation of TCA, based on McDowell’s presentation 
of the argument in (1981). Then, in section 2, I critically evaluate the argument 
and show how non-cognitivists can defend themselves against it. In light of the 
available non-cognitivist responses, I conclude in the third and final section 
that TCA is remarkably weak, given how frequently it is invoked.
TCA is often inadequately presented simply as a stubborn objection against 
the two-component analysis itself (see, for example, Altham 1986, Burton 
1 Ayer (2001[1936]) treats thick concepts either as thin moral concepts or as purely 
descriptive concepts. For an example of the former, see his statement about ‘beautiful’ and 
‘hideous’ (p. 118). For signs of the latter, see his analyses of moral statements such as “Thrift 
is a virtue”, “Stealing money is wrong”, and “Tolerance is a virtue” where he does not notice 
that ‘thrift’, ‘stealing’ and ‘tolerance’ are value-laden concepts (pp. 110, 112, 114).
2 This type of paraphrase captures both Stevenson’s “second pattern of analysis” (1948), 
and Hare’s characterisation of “secondarily evaluative terms” (1970[1952]).
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1992, Millgram 1995, Putnam 2002). Since it is far from obvious why non-
cognitivists need to adopt such an analysis, this makes TCA look ridiculous. 
My reconstruction of TCA (section 1) on the other hand, makes it clear that the 
argument is intended both to show that a two-component approach is inadequate 
in some cases and to show that non-cognitivists must take this inadequate 
approach in order to honour a commitment to treat moral discourse as rational 
(a commitment most contemporary non-cognitivists embrace).  
1  The Thick Concept Argument
I will now present what I take to be the most charitable interpretation of TCA.3 
The presentation is solely based on what I take to be the most accomplished 
articulation of TCA available, found in McDowell’s ‘Non-Cognitivism and 
Rule-Following’ from 1981 (also see McDowell 1978, 1979). Note that 
McDowell never uses the concept of thick concepts, but many authors have 
pointed out McDowell as the original source of TCA.4 Thus, my reading of 
‘Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following’ is based on the assumption that Mc-
Dowell is there presenting an argument that is connected with the existence 
of thick concepts.
McDowell describes what he takes to be the central feature of non-cogni-
tivism in the following way:
Typically, non-cognitivists hold that when we ascribe value to something, what 
is actually happening can be disentangled into two components. Competence 
with an evaluative concept involves, first, a sensitivity to an aspect of the 
world as it really is (as it is independently of value experience), and second, 
a propensity to a certain attitude – a non-cognitive state which constitutes the 
special perspective from which items in the world seem to be endowed with 
the value in question. (McDowell 1981, p. 143)
According to McDowell, this type of two-component analysis requires that
corresponding to any value concept, one can always isolate a genuine feature 
of the world – by the appropriate standard of genuineness: that is, a feature 
that is there anyway, independently of anyone’s value experience being as 
it is – to be that which competent users of the concept are to be regarded as 
responding when they use it [...] (McDowell 1981, p. 144)
3 See Millgram (1995) for various other interpretations of TCA.
4 For example Bernard Williams (1985, pp. 217-218n7), Hilary Putnam (2002, pp. 38-39), 
Charles Taylor (2003, p. 306), James Altham (1986, p. 278n6), and Elijah Millgram (1995, sect. 
2). Gerald Lang (2001) and Alexander Miller (2003), on the other hand, read McDowell’s 1981 
paper without ever making the connection with thick concepts that I make here. 
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With ”a genuine feature of the world,” it is clear that McDowell means a genu-
ine kind of the world. McDowell’s characterisation of the non-cognitivist’s 
conception of genuine kinds plays an important role in TCA. It is unfortunate 
then, that the characterisation is not more precise (and McDowell does not 
provide any examples of kinds that fit the conception).  The conception clearly 
rules out genuine kinds that have intrinsic value or motivating force, however. 
He mentions John Mackie and Hare as examples of moral philosophers who 
embrace the non-cognitivist conception (McDowell 1981, p. 159n6).5 The 
non-cognitivists’ genuine kinds – in McDowell’s view – seem to be kinds that 
figure in a natural scientific framework, in what Gibbard calls ”the Galilean 
core.” This is ”our rough story of how, ultimately, a wide range of things are 
matters of fundamental physics” (Gibbard 1990, p. 123). It is a framework that 
can be used to explain the natural world, including, speculatively, the make-
up and behaviour of its moral agents (their applications of thick concepts, for 
example). Thus, I will use the term Genuine Natural Kind, or GNK, to refer to 
those kinds that are in  line with what McDowell takes to be the non-cognitivist’s 
”appropriate standard of genuineness.”
A competent user of a moral concept must, according to McDowell’s 
characterisation of non-cognitivism, respond to the same kind of natural thing, 
from one application to the next. This requires, according to McDowell, that 
it is in principle possible to “disentangle” a purely descriptive meaning that 
picks out the GNK from the value concept’s meaning. The requirement is 
sometimes expressed by saying that moral concepts have descriptive or natural 
shape. If a moral concept would be descriptively or naturally shapeless, then 
its descriptive meaning would be open-endedly disjunctive.
Hare’s two-component approach certainly fits this characterisation. In the 
case of Hare, the two-component approach is not only taken to account for 
thick concepts but also to develop an account of moral rationality. The de-
scriptive meaning of a concept is construed by Hare as a rule of application. 
If speakers want to make sense to one another when using a concept, then they 
have to follow its rule of application. That is, they have to keep applying the 
concept to things that are all of the same  kind (see Hare’s discussion of ‘red’ 
in 1963, p. 11). This kind is what McDowell calls “a genuine feature of the 
world,” and what I refer to as a GNK.  When one makes a moral judgement, 
say ‘X is courageous’, then the descriptive meaning of  ‘courageous’ picks out 
a kind of behaviour that the evaluative meaning of the judgement latches on 
5 See Mackie  (1977, p. 40). While Mackie may embrace a non-cognitivist conception of 
genuine kinds, he rejects the non-cognitivist conception of moral judgements.
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to (the approval typically attached to ‘courageous’). When we use evaluative 
words, our evaluations attach to certain kinds of the world and are thereby 
universalized.6
With this conception of moral rationality and consistency in mind, McDowell 
further argues that while non-cognitivists may acknowledge that “disentangling” 
is impossible in some cases, they
 [...] can do so only at a price: that of making it problematic whether evalua-
tive language is close enough to the usual paradigms of concept-application 
to count as expressive of judgements at all (as opposed to a kind of sounding 
off). (McDowell 1981, p. 158)
Of course, non-cognitivists do not treat evaluative language exactly as “the 
usual paradigms of concept-application,” but they typically try to show that 
evaluative language inherits some properties of descriptive language that let 
us treat it as “a matter of the genuine application of concepts” (McDowell 
1981, p. 157). At least Hare, Gibbard, and Blackburn work hard to make 
a non-cognitivist view of moral language compatible with its descriptive- 
looking surface. 
Non-cognitivists do not need to argue that the application of all moral con-
cepts is a matter of genuine concept-application, however. While some moral 
concepts are genuine,  the application of  many moral “concepts” may indeed 
be better thought of as “a kind of sounding off.” I will call the non-empty set 
of moral concepts whose application must be construed as genuine the set G, 
and the genuine moral concepts I will call G-members.
We can now formulate the first two premises of TCA in the following 
way:
(P1) The application of every G-member is genuine and G is a non-
empty set.
(P2) If non-cognitivism is true, then a genuine application of a concept 
picks out a GNK.
If a moral concept corresponds to a GNK, then this implies, according to 
McDowell, that its extension can be mastered from “the external standpoint” 
(McDowell 1981, p. 155). This standpoint is the standpoint of someone observ-
ing a moral community from the outside; imagine an anthropologist observing 
6 According to Van Roojen (2005), similar explanations of how relations of (in)consistency 
can hold between moral judgements have been proposed by Frank Jackson (1999) and Stephen 
Barker (2000).
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an alien moral community in an extremely disengaged way. McDowell asks 
us to consider the following thought experiment (also see Williams 1985, pp. 
141-142):
Consider, for instance, a specific conception of some moral virtue: the concep-
tion current in a reasonably cohesive moral community [i.e. a thick concept]. If 
the disentangling manoeuvre is always possible, that implies that the extension 
of the associated term, as it would be used by someone who belonged to the 
community, could be mastered independently of the special concerns which, in 
the community, would show themselves in admiration or emulation of actions 
seen as falling under the concept. That is: one could know which actions the 
term would be applied to, so that one would be able to predict applications 
and withholdings of it in new cases – not merely without oneself sharing the 
community’s admiration (there need be no difficulty about that), but without 
even embarking on an attempt to make sense of their admiration. That would 
be an attempt to comprehend their perspective; whereas, according to the [non-
cognitivist] position I am considering, the genuine feature to which the term 
is applied should be graspable without benefit of understanding the special 
perspective, since sensitivity to it is singled out as an independent ingredient 
in a purported explanation of why occupants of the perspective see things as 
they do. But is it at all plausible that this singling out can always be brought 
off? [Is it plausible that this singling out can be brought off for every thick 
concept?] (McDowell 1981, p. 144)
I will refer to this thought experiment as the External Standpoint Ex-
periment (ESE), and I will call the observer Theo (The external observer). 
Whenever I refer to Theo, I implicitly invoke the situation that he faces in 
ESE. The point of ESE is to raise scepticism about the idea that it is possible 
to disentangle a purely descriptive component (that can pick out a GNK) from 
the meaning of every thick concept. For the argument to work, McDowell must 
claim that at least one of the concepts whose extension Theo cannot master, 
is a G-member.
We may now formulate the remaining two premises of TCA in the fol-
lowing way:
(P3) If the application of a concept picks out a GNK, then it is in prin-
ciple possible for Theo to master the concept’s extension.
(P4) There exists at least one G-member whose extension Theo cannot 
master even in principle.
Note that ESE is a purely hypothetical thought experiment, McDowell is not 
saying that anyone is ever in the position of Theo. Neither is he saying that 
non-cognitivists claim that anyone is in this position. The claim is merely that 
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if non-cognitivism is true, then Theo, whether real or imaginary, must be able 
to master the extensions of all G-members. 
If TCA is sound, then non-cognitivists are forced to either (1) insist that 
all G-members can be disentangled (that is, reject P4), or (2) bar themselves 
from treating the application of some G-members as genuine. The dilemma is 
this: The non-cognitivist cannot choose the former (1), since it contradicts the 
purported “results” of ESE, nor the latter (2), since he is committed to constru-
ing moral discourse involving G-members as genuine discourse. 
The premises P1, P2, P3 and P4 are all we need to arrive at the argument’s 
conclusion with the following steps:
(M1) The application of at least one G-member does not pick out a 
GNK. [Modus tollens, P3 & P4]
(M2) If non-cognitivism is true, then the application of at least one   
G-member is not genuine. [Modus tollens, P2 & M1]
(C) Non-cognitivism is not true. [Modus tollens, M2 & P1]7
TCA obviously hinges on a certain picture of non-cognitivism. McDowell 
assumes that the non-cognitivist readily accepts P1, P2 and P3. Hence, he 
is primarily trying to persuade his readers to accept P4, which he sees as the 
argument’s crucial and contentious premise. ESE is used by McDowell (and his 
fellow Entanglers) as an “intuition pump” to undermine resistance to P4.8 
McDowell also uses a particular interpretation of Wittgenstein’s “rule-
following considerations” in order to get us to accept P4.9 However, this use 
of the rule-following considerations has been strongly criticized (see Miller 
7 The argument can be formalised in the following way:
P1. x(xG → GA(x) )   (GØ)
P2. noncog → x(GA(x)  → GNK(x) )
P3. x(GNK(x)  → THEOME(x) )
P4. x(xG  ¬THEOME(x) )
M1. x(xG  ¬GNK(x) )
M2. noncog → x(xG  ¬GA(x) )
C. ¬noncog
8 See Dennett (1995) on intuition pumps and arguments.      
9 McDowell asserts that “one strand in Wittgenstein’s thought about ‘following a rule’ 
is that the source of the temptation [to think that there ‘must’ be genuine feature of the world 
regulating our use of a concept] is the desire for a security which is actually quite illusory” 
(1981, p. 145). Williams writes that “[t]he idea that it might be impossible to pick up an evalua-
tive concept unless one shared its evaluative interest is basically a Wittgensteinian idea” (1985, 
p. 217-218n7). 
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2003; Millgram 1995; Koons 2001; Lang, 2001). While there is an alleged 
connection between P4 and the rule-following considerations, I believe that 
TCA is best understood as independent of them. First of all, the rule-following 
considerations are considerations that bear on how to think about language 
and meaning in general, while ESE questions the way the meaning of some 
particular thick concepts can be analysed. Secondly, while the rule-following 
considerations may support P4, they seem to undermine P3, thus making them 
incompatible with TCA (Lang 2001, p. 203). The rule-following considerations 
show that even if Theo knows that a concept has been consistently applied to 
a certain GNK previously, this does not guarantee that Theo would be able 
to master the concept’s extension, since the history of the concept’s use does 
not determine its future use. I will not discuss McDowell’s use of the rule- 
following considerations further in this paper.
Before moving on to non-cognitivist responses to TCA, I want to clarify the 
connection between TCA and Williams’ notion of thick concepts. Entanglers 
typically treat some of our thick concepts as the most basic moral concepts, 
while they take thin moral concepts (‘ought’ or ‘good’ for example) to be de-
pendent on a repertoire of thick concepts (for  example, see Anderson 1993, 
sect. 5.2; Hurley 1983; Lovibond 1983, p. 14). They are typically realists with 
regard to the application of thick concepts, but not obviously with regard to 
thin concepts (see McDowell 1998, pp. 151-152). Hence, according to En-
tanglers, some thick concepts ought to be prototypical G-members. Perhaps 
Entanglers also think that thick concepts are the most obvious candidates of 
naturally shapeless concepts. While purely descriptive words may be highly 
polysemous, they are not obviously best construed as corresponding with only 
one concept. But thick concepts on the other hand are shapeful according to 
Entanglers, just not naturally shapeful.
2  Non-Cognitivist Evasive Manoeuvres
I will now shoehorn five well-known non-cognitivists into the frame provided 
by my reconstruction of TCA and show how they can avoid the argument’s 
conclusion. Given that my reconstruction is plausible, there are obviously four 
logically possible moves that non-cognitivists can make to avoid the argument. 
At least three of these moves have been made already by existing non-cogni-
tivists. The following table shows what Ayer, Stevenson, Hare, Gibbard and 
Blackburn would say about P1, P2, P3 and P4.
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Non-cognitivist P1 P2 P3 P4
Ayer/Stevenson False ? ? False
Hare True True True False
Gibbard True False True True?
Blackburn True False True True/False
Table 1 Non-cognitivist responses to TCA.
Ayer and Stevenson
Ayer and Stevenson deny P1, as McDowell himself recognises (1981, p. 158, 
162n28). According to Ayer, moral concepts are mere “pseudo-concepts” and 
moral judgements are “outside the scope of argument” (2001[1936], pp. 115-
116). Similarly, Stevenson claims that conflicts of interests can only be resolved 
by persuasion using non-rational (but not irrational) methods (1938, pp. 344-
350). With this manoeuvre, however, TCA is avoided only by flouting what is 
now a widely accepted desideratum on metaethical theories, namely that they 
can make sense of the idea that moral judgements can be correct or incorrect 
(Smith 1994, ch. 1). Furthermore, the manoeuvre is not very interesting since 
McDowell himself intends TCA to be directed against non-cognitivists who 
believe there are some G-members (McDowell 1981, p. 158, 162n28).
It is not clear what Ayer or Stevenson would say about P2 and P3.
Hare
Hare best fits McDowell’s characterisation of the non-cognitivist. He accepts 
P1, P2 and P3 and he is one of the Entanglers’ primary targets (McDowell 
1981, p. 159n6, Williams 1985, chs. 7-8). 
Hare rejects P4 by insisting that there is no thick concept whose exten-
sion Theo could not master (in principle). Hare intends to comment on Theo’s 
prospects in ESE in the following passage:
It is often said that if we had just the descriptive meaning of ‘kind’ we might, 
indeed, be able to recognise examples of kind people in the existing descrip-
tive sense of the word, but would be unable to extend or extrapolate its use to 
new and perhaps slightly different examples. This seems to me to be simply 
false. Suppose that I am a hard-bitten person [...], and can recognize the quali-
ties that people call kind and esteem, but do not myself esteem them. And 
suppose that some new example is produced of a person who does not have 
exactly those qualities, but has qualities very like them, so that people who do 
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esteem them are likely to esteem that person too, and call him kind. I can see 
no difficulty in my predicting that this is what they will do. In order to make 
this prediction I do not myself have to esteem the qualities or the person; I 
only have to be confident that they will. I find it surprising that people should 
rely on this very weak argument. (Hare 1997, p. 61)
Hare clearly does not understand TCA. 
First, he simply assumes that there must be an “existing descriptive sense” 
of a thick concept when the very point of ESE is to show that there is not al-
ways such an existing sense (not to show that Theo may not be able to master 
a thick concept’s extension with its existing descriptive sense). According to 
Hare, there is, or must be, some unifying descriptive feature that forms a base 
from which the hard-bitten person or Theo can extrapolate the future use of a 
thick concept. In effect, Hare uses ESE to support the idea that thick concepts 
have shape. 
Secondly, Hare simply assumes that “the qualities that people call kind 
and esteem” are purely descriptive qualities. However, Entanglers deny that 
the qualities picked out by a thick concept are always purely descriptive. Ac-
cording to Entanglers, some thick concepts only have shape at an evaluative 
level as they pick out an evaluative quality. 
Finally, Hare implicitly attributes to Entanglers the claim that Theo must 
accept  the evaluation embedded in the observed community’s thick concept 
in order to master the concept’s extension. However, this attribution is either 
mistaken or in need of an explanation. When describing ESE, McDowell ex-
plicitly denies the claim that Hare attributes to Entanglers: 
one could know which actions the term [corresponding with some thick 
concept] would be applied to [...] - not merely without oneself sharing the 
community’s admiration (there need be no difficulty about that), but without 
even embarking on an attempt to make sense of their admiration. (1981, p. 
144; my emphasis) 
Williams also denies the claim. He stresses the possibility of what he elsewhere 
calls “the ethnographic stance” (1986, pp. 203-204): 
An insightful observer can indeed come to understand and anticipate the use of 
the concept without actually sharing the values of the people who use it [...]. 
But in imaginatively anticipating the use of the concept, the observer also has 
to grasp imaginatively its evaluative point. (Williams, 1985, pp. 141-142)
However, it is not clear what the difference is between (a) accepting the 
evaluation embedded in a thick concept (“sharing the values”), and (b) grasp-
ing the thick concept’s “evaluative point” imaginatively without accepting 
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it, where (b) cannot amount to acquiring a purely descriptive equivalent of 
the concept.10 Hare’s attribution is not entirely unwarranted until Entanglers 
provide a clear account of this difference. 
There seems to be a stand-off between different intuitions regarding P4. 
The competing intuitions only furnish arguments acceptable to the already 
converted. However, I believe the burden of proof is Hare’s, since the claim of 
his intuition is stronger than the claim of the Entanglers’ intuition. He claims 
that a purely descriptive meaning can be disentangled from all thick concepts, 
while Entanglers merely claim that there is at least one G-member from which 
a purely descriptive meaning cannot be disentangled.
Blackburn: Defusing Shapelessness
Gibbard and Blackburn, like Hare, accept P1 and go to great lengths to under-
stand how a naturalistic non-cognitivism can be compatible with a conception 
of moral discourse as answerable to reasons and arguments. They argue that 
they can embrace P1 but reject or disregard P2. While their conception of 
GNKs is clearly in line with McDowell’s characterisation , they do not claim 
that evaluations (not even ideal ones) must map onto them: Yes, the applica-
tion of some moral concepts must be construed as genuine (it must be possible 
to “go on doing the same thing” when applying them), but genuine concept- 
application does not need to pick out GNKs.11  Hence, some G-members may 
be shapeless but this is of no consequence for non-cognitivism. 
In a sense, I think that Gibbard and Blackburn embrace P1 less whole-
heartedly than Hare. The metaethical projects that Gibbard and Blackburn are 
engaged in starts from a naturalistic world view and are aimed at explaining 
moral discourse and thought from within this view. If moral judgements do 
not look quite as robust as some instance of genuine concept-application when 
viewed from a naturalistic Galilean standpoint, then so much the worse for 
moral judgements. However, both Gibbard and Blackburn argue that moral 
judgements remain robust after their Galilean inspection. They argue that an 
evolutionary and developmental story of the origin our moral capacities can 
explain why some degree of consistency is important, and some can also be 
justified by appeal to considerations of justice and impartiality (Blackburn 
1981, p. 180, Gibbard 1990, pp. 284-291).
10 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer who reminded me of this. See Altham 1986, 
pp. 277-280 and Millgram 1995, pp. 360-365 for discussions about how to understand Williams’ 
notion of an evaluative point or perspective.
11 One could also say that Blackburn and Gibbard do not accept the dichotomy between 
genuine concept-application and “sounding off” that McDowell imputes on them.
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I agree with McDowell that if non-cognitivists accept P4, then they can-
not, like Hare, piggyback consistency on top of GNKs (with regard to the ap-
plication of shapeless concepts). What alternative conception of consistency 
and rationality is available to Blackburn and Gibbard then? Blackburn briefly 
describes his alternative conception in the following way:
I believe that we do require a conception of ‘going on in the same way’ in 
ethics, not in the sense that we demand that all the things to which we have a 
given attitude form one kind, but in the sense that it worries us if we cannot 
draw distinctions when we react differently. (Blackburn 1981, p. 170)
There are two differences between this conception and the one that McDowell 
claims non-cognitivists must embrace. First, there is a shift from a “demand” 
to a “worry”, and secondly, a shift from correspondences between attitudes 
and GNKs to the idea that cases (situations, actions, characters) which 
differ in value must also differ in description. In other words, when the same 
(descriptive) shape recurs but we react differently, there is need for reflection 
and re-evaluation. But there is no need to demand that one type of reaction 
(applying the concept ‘kind’, say) cannot be elicited by different natural features 
in different cases. This “thin” conception of consistency follows from what 
I take to be an uncontroversial assumption that the moral weakly supervenes 
on the nonmoral.12 
Since P2 is rejected, Gibbard and Blackburn can safely take an agnostic 
stance toward P3 and P4. However, Gibbard finds P4 plausible and Blackburn 
explicitly accepts that Theo cannot master the extension of some thick concepts 
in responses to both McDowell and Williams (Gibbard 1990, pp. 114-115, 1992, 
p. 270; Blackburn 1981, p. 167, 1986, p. 199, 1998, p. 96-99). According to 
Blackburn, Theo does not merely face a difficult practical problem in trying to 
discern a unifying descriptive feature of a thick concept, “there is no a priori 
reason to expect there to be a unifying feature” (1981, p. 167). 
While Blackburn clearly believes that some thick concepts are shapeless, 
it is not clear how commonplace he believes shapelessness to be, or whether 
he believes that there are shapeless G-members.13 The only concepts that he 
12 In other words, the assumption is that two cases cannot differ morally unless they also 
differ nonmorally. If this dependency relation holds in the actual world but not in all possible 
worlds, then the moral supervenes weakly on the nonmoral. If it also holds in all possible worlds, 
then the moral supervenes strongly on the nonmoral.
13 Crary (2002, p. 390n38) claims that Blackburn’s view of thick concepts changed be-
tween (1981), when he embraced P4, and (1992), when he rejected P4. I think his view remained 
the same, however. In any case, he clearly embraces P4 in (1998, p. 98).
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explicitly claims to be shapeless are ‘funny’, ‘divine’, and ‘gross’ (1998, pp. 
96-98). When it comes to ‘fat↓’  (‘fat’ delivered in “a characteristic sneering 
tone of voice”), “pejorative racial slurs”, ‘cruel’, and ‘courageous’ on the other 
hand, Blackburn believes that they have shape.14 In the following passage, 
Blackburn seems to say that most thick concepts have descriptive or natural 
shape:
Whenever there is a ‘thick’ term it is easy to see both its general descriptive 
orientation, and its general practical or attitude-giving one. [...] We know 
that someone described as courageous is usually approved of for overcoming 
difficulties and dangers that would daunt others, that someone described as 
niggardly is attracting obloquy for being too careful with his money, and so on. 
There is a circumscribed range of inputs and outputs. And this is how it has to 
be, for we have to know the kind of thing, at the ‘subjacent’ [descriptive] level, 
to retail in order to engage someone’s will when we are prescribing courses 
of action. (Blackburn 1998, pp. 102-103; also 1981, p. 180 on the benefits of 
inculcating and acquiring descriptively shapeful concepts)
A way of avoiding TCA can be glimpsed here that has not, as far as I know, 
been given any attention in metaethical debates surrounding thick concepts. The 
concepts that are shapeless according to Blackburn – ‘funny’, ‘gross’, ‘divine’ 
– are not concepts that obviously qualify as G-members. A non-cognitivist 
may reject P4 by arguing that there are no thick concepts that are shapeless 
but genuine. This move allows the non-cognitivist to hold on to the Hare’s 
conception of moral rationality, while granting that Theo may not be able to 
master the extension of some thick concepts (that are not G-members). With 
this move, two kinds of thick concepts are created: the thick genuine concepts 
whose extensions Theo can master and the thick pseudo-concepts whose exten-
sions Theo cannot master, which are mere means of “sounding off”.
What supports the claim that most or all thick concepts have shape? To 
explain the moral judgements of an agent we must, if we are Galilean natu-
ralists, assume that different judgements are the outcome of different natural 
features that the agent confronts (Blackburn 1981, pp. 168-169). If thick 
concepts do not have shape then it appears that we cannot explain how moral 
agents acquire and use thick concepts within a naturalistic framework. This 
may be a mere appearance though. Jonathan Dancy (1998) has argued that 
connectionist models of cognition and prototype theories of concepts show that 
it is at least possible that a natural moral agent can master the extension of a 
14 Blackburn 1998, p. 96 on ‘fat↓’ and “pejorative racial slurs”, pp. 99-100 on ‘cruel’, 
pp. 102-103 on ‘courageous’. 
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shapeless concept.15 Nevertheless, we should expect that teaching and learning 
a shapeful concept is less costly than teaching and learning one without shape, 
and hence that most concepts have shape (Blackburn 1981, p. 180). 
3  Conclusion
I have attempted both to present a charitable interpretation of TCA, and, to 
some extent, assess the argument’s impact. My explication of the argument 
makes it clear that it is not only intended to establish that a two-component 
approach to some thick concepts is untenable on its own, but also to establish 
that non-cognitivists have to take a two-component approach if they want to 
construe the application of those thick concepts as genuine (that is, as consistent 
or as rational). The explication also highlighted, with the introduction of the set 
G, the need to ask which concepts that are descriptively shapeless and which 
concepts that must be construed as genuine.
By large, I think TCA is unsuccessful against non-cognitivism. It is far 
from obvious why non-cognitivists must take a two-component approach to 
thick concepts, and Entanglers have not yet shown convincingly why alterna-
tive non-cognitivist approaches fail or is incompatible with other commitments 
made by non-cognitivists. Non-cognitivists can argue that while there are (or 
may be) shapeless thick concepts (such as, perhaps, ‘funny’, ‘gross’, etc), all 
the important thick concepts (the G-members, such as, perhaps, ‘courageous’, 
‘cruel’, etc) do in fact have shape. Alternatively, they may accept that there 
are “genuine” but shapeless thick concepts and avoid TCA by articulating a 
conception of moral rationality that is compatible with such shapelessness. 
Moreover, TCA is far from conclusive even against non-cognitivists who take 
a two-component approach. TCA rests on a contestable intuition concerning 
Theo’s prospects in ESE, and I do not believe the Entanglers have shown why 
this intuition is correct (even though I have granted that the burden of proof 
regarding Theo’s prospects is on Disentanglers such as Hare who deny that 
any concept is naturally shapeless rather than on Entanglers).16
Olle Blomberg
olle.blomberg@gmail.com
15 Interesting further explorations of connectionism and moral particularism that take the 
cue from Dancy can be found in the work of Marcello Guarini (2005, 2006).
16 I would like to thank my former supervisor Bo Petersson for his contagious 
enthusiasm, and the Department of Religion and Culture at Linköpings universitet 
for financial support. I also want to thank Martin Andersson, Marion Godman, Eli-
jah Millgram, my audience at the GAP.6 conference in Berlin, and two anonymous 
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